Finally, mathematical models go even one step further from the real world; they model not only the auction rules and the environment within which the auction occurs, but may model the bidders.
If
analytically tractable, such models suggest hypotheses to be tested experimentally, hypotheses that might otherwise not have been thought of.
However, the increased flexibility in defining situations also carries an increased responsibility; by modelling the bidders in addition to the auction itself, the chances to misrepresent the real world increase.
In particular, the usefulness of a model depends on So defining f(z) = (l-a)z/a for non-positive z, and f(z) = for non- Nash equilibrium is independent of a illustrates the theorem.)
To determine i's optimal bid, start with three observations. First, the other bidders will never bid greater than (n-l)/n.
If i bids at least (n-l)/n then he always wins. Bidding greater than (n-l)/n increases the price without increasing the probability of winning. Thus, i should never bid greater than (n-l)/n. n In fact, the stated strategy is unique (symmetric) equilibrium strategy for this example.
Notice that this equilibrium differs from that when a = 1 (where b(x) = (n-l)x/n = x/2 for n = 2 was the unique equilibrium strategy). 
